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Introduction 
'O the thrill of the open road!' The prospect of taking ownership of a new car is relished 
by many people. However, few would be considering an outing in the country behind the 
wheel of a BYD S8, a Shuanghuan Auto CEO, or a Zotye T700. These trade marks are 
unknown, and may not conjure up visions in a brand-conscious public of an altogether 
elegant chariot. Motorists' perceptions would most likely be different if the vehicle 
involved was, instead, a well-known luxury brand like a Mercedes-Benz CLK Cabriolet, a 
BMW X5, or a Porsche Macan. The former group of vehicles (amongst others) are 
currently being manufactured in, of all places, China (S Carson 'Spot the difference: 
China's copycat cars' MSN 22 April 2016, available at http://www.msn.com/en-
gb/cars/enthusiasts/spot-the-difference-chinas-copycat-cars/ss-BBrKGtd#image=15, 
accessed on 1 September 2016). The relationship between these two groups of cars is 
that the shapes of the first are virtually identical to those of the second group, but the 
trade marks and provenance do of course differ. 
One lateral rationalisation offered by a designer in China is that '[t]he truth is that car 
designs are becoming more and more homogenous. The situation is chaotic.' 
(Autocar 'Zotye to unveil Porsche Macan clone at Beijing motor show' 13 April 2016, 
available at http://www.autocar.co.uk/car-news/motor-shows-beijing-motor-
show/zotye-unveil-porsche-macan-clone-beijing-motor-show, accessed on 8 April 2016.) 
In the absence of the will to attempt to ascertain the intricacies of Chinese law, we shall 
rather endeavour to answer the question of what potential legal grounds may exist for 
protection against such copying, should it take place in South Africa (see also Erica 
Pruetz 'Protecting car design internationally: A comparison of British and American 
design laws' (2002) 24 Loyola LA International & Comparative L Rev 475). This question 
is 
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discussed below in more detail, having regard to the various categories of intellectual 
property in our law. 
Copyright law 
A colourful situation where copying took place in the United States is found in the facts 
of DC Comics v Mark Towle (2:11-cv–03934-RSWL-OP (9th Cir 2015), available 
at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/cx/2015_DCComics.pdf, accessed on 17 
May 2016). The court had to decide whether the defendant had infringed DC Comics' 
exclusive rights under copyright when he built and sold replicas of the Batmobile, as it 
appeared in the 1966 television show Batman and the 1989 film Batman. In this matter 
a Ford Mustang car (called Eleanor) that appeared in the 2000 remake of the Gone in 60 
Seconds film featured. The defendant started to sell replicas of Eleanor. The court used a 
test with three elements for determining whether a character in a comic book, television 
programme or motion picture is entitled to copyright protection (ibid para 38). First, the 
character must generally have 'physical as well as conceptual qualities'. Secondly, the 
character must be 'sufficiently delineated' so as to be recognisable as the same character 
whenever it appears by displaying consistent identifiable character traits and attributes, 
but it need not have a consistent appearance. Thirdly, the character must be 'especially 
distinctive' and 'contain some unique elements of expression', but cannot be a stock 
character. The court, applying these factors, decided that the Batmobile qualified for 
copyright protection (ibid para 45). Ultimately, the court held that there was 
infringement (ibid para 59). 
The South African Copyright Act 98 of 1978 provides, amongst others, for the 
protection of artistic works, irrespective of the artistic quality thereof. 'Artistic works' 
include works of craftsmanship. Works of craftsmanship recognised in case law are, for 
instance, a prototype of furniture, a motor-car silencer, and a wooden model of a kitchen 
appliance (Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law (1987; revision service June 
2015) para 2.6.4). It can be argued that a vehicle can be a work of craftsmanship, and 
that copyright might subsist therein as an artistic work. As such, all the normal rights 
would be associated with it in principle. However, the provisions of s 15(3A)(ii) would be 
problematic in the context of the enforcement of rights in the car's shape. The section 
provides as follows: 
'The copyright in an artistic work of which three-dimensional reproductions were made available, 
whether inside or outside the Republic, to the public by or with the consent of the copyright owner 
(hereinafter referred to as authorised reproductions), shall not be infringed if any person without 
the consent of the owner makes or makes available to the public three-dimensional reproductions 
or adaptations of the authorised reproductions, provided — ... 
     (ii)   the authorised reproductions primarily have a utilitarian purpose and are made by an industrial 
process.' 
Cars are objects having, par excellence, a utilitarian purpose, that being to transport 
people or goods. This would, accordingly, exclude protection if the 
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car itself is copied. What should be borne in mind, though, is that what is described by 
Dean (op cit para 9.15.2) as the 'forfeiture' of those rights typically associated with an 
artistic work only takes place where the copying by B is done from A's three-dimensional 
object. It seems to follow that where B copies A's design drawings of the (whole) car 
(being artistic works themselves), it would amount to copyright infringement. However, 
practically speaking, to obtain such drawings would be a very difficult task. All in all, 
thus, copyright law does not offer much practical assistance. 
Unlawful competition and passing off 
Unlawful competition 
A pivotal case must be the decision in Schultz v Butt1986 (3) SA 667 (A). Here, B copied 
A's boat by making copies from a mould which was constructed by using the shape of A's 
boat. Accordingly, there was direct physical copying. The court stated certain important 
principles. The first is that the fact that B directly copied A's product is relevant as it 
would be condemned by the community as unfair (ibid para 40). The court also said that 
'[i]n South Africa the legislature has not limited the protection of the law in cases of 
copying to those who enjoy rights of intellectual property under statutes. The fact that in 
a particular case there is no protection by way of patent, copyright or registered design, 
does not license a trader to carry on his business in unfair competition with his rivals' 
(para 40). Unlawful competition was found to exist. The opposite was found in Bress 
Designs v (Pty) Ltd v GY Lounge Suite Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd1991 (2) SA 455 (W), 
where a lounge suite was disassembled and copied. Here it was held that copying 
beyond statutory protection was permitted (ibid at 474F). The court held that unlawful 
competition took place on the ground of the respondent's motive of competing 
destructively, not on account of the copying that took place as such. It also noted that 
the method of copying is not of any consequence (ibid at 474G). 
Yet another twist in the road came with the decision in Premier Hangers CC v Polyoak 
(Pty) Ltd1997 (1) SA 416 (A), which involved the copying of clothes hangers. In relation 
to a claim for unlawful competition, the court stated (paras 16–18, emphasis supplied): 
'What is also clear is that in general in our system of law, as with the English system and other 
systems, efforts have been made both to prevent double or overlapping protection and to ensure 
strict time limits to the monopoly periods granted. This, as I hope to show, has a bearing on the 
present case. Finally, it remains to say that in most foreign systems where unfair competition rules 
apply there appears to be a search where relief is to be given for some special unfairness in that 
which has been done. This, all too frequently, is a difficult task because it is hampered in a case 
such as the present by the vast differences in the amount of effort and skill which is called for in 
the design of articles which would warrant statutory protection. This is acutely so where matters of 
shape or appearance are under consideration. In my view, it was considerations such as the 
aforegoing that underlie the decision in the Butt case. The finding was that 
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copying per se was not unlawful. It was only the existence of extraneous factors that rendered the 
unsuccessful party's conduct unlawful. Thus it appears to me that in our law, as in many of the 
foreign systems to which Ms Fellner refers, where statutory protection can be claimed but is not, 
or where statutory protection expires or is lost, anyone is free to copy.' 
In the above emphasised passage, the Schultz case seems to have been overruled, 
except that the court did seem prepared to consider extraneous unfairness, if evidence 
to that effect was presented. Also relevant is the court's remark that the evaluation of 
special unfairness is complicated by the vast differences in the amount of effort and skill 
involved in the design of items. To this form of unfairness may be added the issue of 
finances. For example, the production costs of one sports vehicle were said to be US$75 
million (some years ago — Chrysler Corp v Silva 188 F 3d (1st Cir 1997) 56 at 57). 
Today, internet sources, for what they are worth, indicate that the cost for a normal car 
might be as high as US$1 billion (Autoblog 'Why does it cost so much for automakers to 
develop new models' 27 July 2010, available 
at http://www.autoblog.com/2010/07/27/why-does-it-cost-so-much-for-automakers-to-
develop-new-models, accessed on 26 May 2016; and N Gibbs 'Alfa will start Europe sales 
of "make or break" Giulia next month' Automotive News 27 May 2016, available 
at http://www.autonews.com/article/20160527/COPY01/305279926/alfa-will-start-
europe-sales-of-make-or-break-giulia-next-month?cciid=email-autonews-daily, accessed 
on 27 May 2016). It is submitted that this factor alone could constitute special 
unfairness. Against this background, with respect, the copying of a simple object such as 
a hanger would indeed seem not to warrant protection due to 'vast differences', in the 
court's words. 
Turning to writers, J Neethling (Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful 
Competition (2008)) deals with what is termed the direct adoption of a rival's 
performance, and seems to be undeterred by the Premier Hangers case's dictum relating 
to freedom to copy. The direct adoption of a rival's performance is said to be contra 
bonos mores (ibid at 234). Under the rubric of the identical duplication of a rival's 
performance, he states that a product that is in the public domain may be freely copied 
(ibid at 237). Protection might be available, though, where an own identity is present. 
However, something unusual or exceptional should be present (ibid at 238). It is 
regrettable that Neethling does not fully engage with the Premier Hangersruling, as it 
challenges his view of granting wider protection directly. Be that as it may, according to 
his above methodology, Neethling would seem to support protection against the copying 
of a car's shape in principle, subject to the condition mentioned. 
In another judgment dealing with a 'transport vehicle', Heyneman v Waterfront 
Marine CC & others [2005] 2 All SA 382 (C), the copying of inflatable boats was 
considered. The grounds of passing off and unlawful competition were both rejected. The 
court stated (ibid para 75, emphasis supplied): 
'Understandably there has been no attempt to seek protection by registration of the design, shape, 
form or get-up of any of the boats. The reason is obvious. 
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Rigid inflatable boats are, for the most part, similar in design, shape, form and get-up, the 
differences relating to cosmetic rather than functional aspects thereof. From the day the second 
applicant produced and sold its first Falcon, it became part of the public domain and would enjoy 
protection only if a competitor should pass off its boat as a Falcon product.' 
The emphasised passage illustrates the effect of the lack of what Neethling requires — 
having an own identity. In another 'boat case', the introduction of s 15(3A) of the 
Copyright Act was seen to dilute the type of remedy provided by the Schultz case even 
further (Van der Merwe & another v Els [2008] ZAWCHC 31 para 42). Essentially, there 
seems to be at least some scope for a remedy. 
An interpretation of the Schultz ruling (given after the Premier Hangers decision) is 
provided in Martin Johnson (Pty) Ltd v Cardello Footwear Manufacturers CC [1999] 3 All 
SA 81 (N), a case which dealt with lasts for shoes. The court stated certain relevant 
factors which indicate that it still considered such an action to be viable (ibid at 84–5). 
The Premier Hangersruling was not even mentioned; a single case was referred to, that 
being the Schultz ruling. In other words, one Supreme Court of Appeal decision was 
preferred over another. Also of importance is the court's conclusion that '[i]n the present 
case the applicant has, in my view, failed to establish that which was allegedly copied 
was the product of any significant inventiveness or labour on its part. On the contrary, it 
appears to be a basic utilitarian design in general use and without any unique features 
whatsoever' (ibid at 85, emphasis supplied). This links up with the view expressed above 
in relation to hangers. 
Another decision which did not mention the Premier Hangers case, but only 
the Schultz ruling, is Daimler Chrysler Aktiengesellschaft v Afinta Motor Corporation (Pty) 
Ltd [2001] 2 All SA 219 (T). With regard to unlawful competition, the court held that the 
respondent simply used the applicant's (Sprinter) vehicle parts. The evidence indicated, 
amongst others, that although the bus was wider than the Sprinter vehicle it retained 
the shape or configuration of the Sprinter cab and the wheel design, which was said not 
to be fortuitous (ibid at 229). This applied particularly to the front-end design and shape 
of the bonnet, the front fenders and the wrap-around headlights. This conduct was thus 
in conflict with the boni mores. Accordingly, unlawful competition was found to exist (ibid 
at 231). It is not easy to reconcile this outcome with the sentiments expressed in 
the Premier Hangers case, yet it is submitted that the outcome is fair and just. But, 
strictly speaking, the decision runs counter to the narrow approach of the Premier 
Hangers ruling. 
Passing off 
It is trite that the requirements for passing off in South Africa are the existence of a 
reputation, and, secondly, the likelihood of confusion. 
Reputation 
In terms of protecting the shape of a car on the above ground, a relevant decision in the 
United States is Ferrari SPA Esercizio Fabriche Automobili 
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E Corse v Carl Roberts 944 F 2d 1235 (6th Cir 1991) 1239. The question in this case was 
whether the copying of Ferrari cars amounted to a contravention of s 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act of 1946 (15 USC § 1051) which, in short, prohibits the use of a confusing 
trade mark. This provision is comparable to the South African remedy of passing off. The 
defendant sold a kit-car version of famous Ferrari vehicles (the Testarossa and the 
Daytona Spyder). Ferrari's case in this instance was described by the court as a 'trade 
dress' claim. Ferrari alleged that the unique and distinctive exterior, shape, and design 
of its cars had been infringed. The defendant argued that there has been no 
infringement for a number of reasons; amongst others, that there was no actionable 
likelihood of confusion between Ferrari's vehicles and the respondent's replicas at the 
point of sale. The court first considered whether the shapes concerned had acquired 
secondary meaning. Importantly, 'Ferrari's vehicles would not acquire secondary 
meaning merely because they were unique designs or because they are aesthetically 
beautiful. The design must be one that is instantly identified in the mind of the informed 
viewer as a Ferrari design' (ibid at 1239). The court found that the defendant's 
admission that he had intentionally copied Ferrari's design, the survey evidence 
introduced by Ferrari, and the testimony of people in the trade, amount to abundant 
evidence that the exterior design features of the Ferrari vehicles had acquired secondary 
meaning (ibid at 1240). 
Confusion 
In the Ferrari judgment, the defendant argued that for purposes of the Lanham Act, the 
requisite likelihood of confusion must be confusion at the point of sale, and not the 
confusion of non-purchasing, casual observers. The evidence indicated that the 
defendant informed purchasers of his replicas that they were not purchasing genuine 
Ferraris (ibid at 1244). Consequently, his customers were not confused about what they 
were buying. He also argued that actionable confusion may not be inferred from 
intentional copying when the intentional copying involves the design of a product as 
opposed to the copying of a trade mark, trade name or trade dress. Implicit, of course, 
said the court, is the related argument that the exterior shape and design of the Ferrari 
cars are not, and cannot be, a trade mark or trade dress (ibid at 1245). The court stated 
that it is not only the immediate buyer that is relevant, but that other persons may also 
be confused. The court quoted from the court a quo's judgment, which is couched in 
dilution-type language (ibid at 1245): 
'Ferrari has gained a well-earned reputation for making uniquely designed automobiles of quality 
and rarity. The DAYTONA SPYDER design is well-known among the relevant public and exclusively 
and positively associated with Ferrari. If the country is populated with hundreds, if not thousands, 
of replicas of rare, distinct, and unique vintage cars, obviously they are no longer unique. Even if a 
person seeing one of these replicas driving down the road is not confused, Ferrari's exclusive 
association with this design has been diluted and eroded. If the replica Daytona looks cheap or in 
disrepair, Ferrari's reputation for rarity and quality could be damaged.' 
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L T C Harms (The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Casebook (2012) 117) 
refers to a decision dealing with trade marks for vehicles, namely Picasso v Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) and DaimlerChrysler AG 
(Case C-361/04 P, 12 January 2006), where the following was said apropos the issue of 
confusion (ibid para 39): 
'Therefore, the Court of First Instance was fully entitled to hold, in paragraph 59 of the judgment 
under appeal, that, for the purposes of assessing, as provided for in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 
No 40/94, whether there is any likelihood of confusion between marks relating to motor vehicles, 
account must be taken of the fact that, in view of the nature of the goods concerned and in 
particular their price and their highly technological character, the average consumer displays a 
particularly high level of attention at the time of purchase of such goods.' 
This could imply that a consumer will be aware that a similar looking car would be 
(correctly) identified as brand X, not Y, particularly having regard to factors such as the 
prominent display of insignia at a vehicle showroom and on the car itself (the former 
may be true to a lesser degree of used cars). This consideration might exclude passing 
off in given instances, thus leaving unlawful competition as the only remedy. In 
the Heyneman ruling (supra) reference was made to the 'reasonably cautious and 
discerning purchaser, who has at least some knowledge of the luxury item he is 
proposing to purchase, [and] would not be misled' (ibid para 78). Also, the trade marks 
of the boats in that case were 'prominently distinctive feature[s]' (ibid). Factual 
scenarios can of course differ. 
In terms of British decisions, reference can be made to the recent ruling in The 
London Taxi Corporation Limited trading as the London Taxi Company v (1) Frazer-Nash 
Research Limited and (2) Ecotive Limited [2016] EWHC 52 (Ch). This case dealt with 
alleged passing off and trade-mark infringement of the shape of taxi cabs. With regard 
to the issue of the average consumer, the court considered members of the public to be 
consumers of taxi services, not taxis (a broader approach was adopted later, however). 
Instead, since taxis are expensive and specialised vehicles, taxi drivers are 
knowledgeable and careful purchasers: that is to say, their level of attention is fairly 
high. However, since taxi services are inexpensive, and since consumers are often in a 
hurry, their attention levels are low (ibid para 163). They are the average purchasers. 
The issue of confusion also featured in a judgment where a motor vehicle was actually 
copied, being the Afinta decision (supra). The applicant's vehicle was called a Sprinter, 
and that of the other party an AMC. The court remarked that although the respondent 
applied its trade mark AMC and the words 'AMC People Mover' to the bus, this would not 
prevent deception or confusion arising, especially where the vehicles are seen at a 
distance (ibid at 229). It held (ibid) that 
'[e]ven when these features become legible it is not clear that the people and the market will 
appreciate immediately that the vehicle is made by a different manufacturer from the Sprinter. It 
is by no means clear that the AMC trade mark is well-known and immediately recognisable in the 
relevant market. The Mercedes Benz name and trade marks clearly are.' 
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Since the court found that there was reputation, it ruled in favour of the applicant (also) 
on the basis of passing off. 
Registering car-shape trade marks 
General 
The protection of shapes has always been a contentious issue for various reasons. In so 
far as South African trade-mark law is concerned, the basic approach is set out in the 
case of Die Bergkelder Bpk v Vredendal Koöp Wynmakery & others2006 (4) SA 275 
(SCA), which dealt with the shape of a bottle. In this case the court said the following 
(paras 7 and 8): 
'Importantly, from a legal perspective these [shape] trade marks do not differ from any other kind 
of trade mark: 
"The criteria for assessing the distinctive character of three-dimensional shape-of-products marks 
are no different from those applicable to other categories of trade marks." 
However, from a practical point of view they stand on a different footing. 
The problem they pose for their promoters is that according to the public perception containers 
and shapes generally do not, in American parlance, serve as source identifiers.' 
It was further mentioned that since containers are not usually perceived to be source 
indicators, a container mark must, in order to be able to fulfil a trade mark function, at 
least differ significantly from the norm or custom of the sector (ibid para 9). This was 
stated with reference to Henkel KgaA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
(Trade Marks and Designs) (joined cases C-456/01 P and C-457/01 P decision, 29 April 
2004)). In the latter decision, which involved detergent blocks, it was said that the 
shape of a product itself does not serve to indicate the product's origin, save in 
exceptional cases (ibid para 25). Also notable is the judgment of Lubbe NO v Millennium 
Style (Pty) Ltd (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 241 (SCA), which dealt with patterns on shoe 
soles, and where it was stated that none of the devices had any trade-mark significance, 
and that they would be perceived by the public as mere sole-tread designs (ibid para 9). 
A relevant decision in this context is that in Jaguar Land Rover Ltd v Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (case T-629/14, a 
decision of the General Court of the European Union, 25 November 2015). This matter 
dealt with an appeal against the partial refusal of an application for registration of the 
shape of a motor vehicle, that being the Range Rover Evoque. This case was considered 
in terms of reg 7(1)(b) of European Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 
2009 on the community trade mark (now the European Union Trade Mark). This 
provision determines that one cannot register a mark which is 'devoid of any distinctive 
character'. The application was based on a number of drawings. (It can be remarked that 
the drawings did not do the vehicle justice: the high belt line and the low aggressive 
stance which give the Evoque its particular look do not appear as striking in the drawings 
as on the actual vehicle.) 
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The court stated a number of principles, those pertinent to the matter under 
discussion being the following. The first is that average consumers do not make 
assumptions about the origin of products on the basis of their shape in the absence of 
any graphic or textual element. Accordingly, it might be more difficult to prove a 
distinctive character in relation to such a three-dimensional mark than in relation to a 
word or figurative mark (ibid at 19). In such circumstances, 'only a mark which departs 
significantly from the norm or customs of the sector and thereby fulfils its essential 
function of indicating origin is not devoid of any distinctive character' (ibid at 20). The 
assessment should be whether the shape in issue 'rather than departing significantly 
from the norm or customs of the sector, is merely a variation of the typical shape of a 
car and is, therefore, devoid of any distinctive character' (ibid at 45). Applying these 
principles, the application for motor vehicles was refused. It is ironic that the vehicle won 
the 2012 World Design Car of the Year (Wikipedia 'Range Rover Evoque' available 
at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Range_Rover_Evoque, accessed on 8 June 2016). The 
famous words of Jacob J in British Sugar Plc v James Robertson & Sons Ltd [1996] RPC 
281 at 306 might be apposite here (emphasis supplied): 
'What does devoid of any distinctive character mean? I think the phrase requires consideration of 
the mark on its own, assuming no use. Is it the sort of word (or other sign) which cannot do the 
job of distinguishing without first educating the public that it is a trade mark?' 
Also relevant on the issue of the registration standard applicable to (car) shapes is an 
infringement judgment in the London Taxi case (supra). The court first had to consider 
certain attacks on the marks concerned, both the United Kingdom version and the 
European Union Trade Mark (previously a Community Trade Mark ('CTM')). One ground 
was that the marks were devoid of any distinctive character (art 3(1)(b) of European 
Council Directive 2008/95/EC of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the 
member states relating to trade marks (codified version replacing Directive 
89/104/EEC), the former being replaced in turn by Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of 
the member states relating to trade marks); reg 7(1)(b) of the Regulations). The court 
dealt with earlier case law, and made the following comment (London Taxi(supra) para 
172, emphasis supplied): 
'In my view counsel's submission receives support from decisions such as Jaguar v OHIM. As a 
matter of principle, however, it seems to me that Jacob LJ's reasoning in Bongrain is correct: the 
fact that the shape of a product is unusual is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for it to 
have inherent distinctive character. At some point this question will have to be referred to the 
CJEU.' 
The court then assessed the European Trade Mark as follows (ibid para 174, emphasis 
supplied): 
'Counsel for LTC submitted that both the Trade Marks looked different to other cars, and in 
particular looked like 1950s cars. I accept both points, but in my judgment neither suffices to 
establish that the CTM would be regarded as 
2017 SALJ 228 
departing significantly from the norms and customs of the sector. In my view the CTM would have 
been perceived by the average consumer of taxis as merely a variation of the typical shape of a 
taxi. I should make it clear that, if one considers the question from the perspective of the average 
consumer of cars, in my view the CTM would be perceived as merely a variation of the typical 
shape of a car. Furthermore, even if the shape was regarded as departing significantly from the 
norms and customs of the sector, it would not have been perceived as identifying the origin of the 
goods. Accordingly, I conclude that the CTM was devoid of inherent distinctive character. ... I 
should make it clear that my assessment would not differ if, contrary to the conclusion I have 
reached above, the relevant average consumer consists of or includes a consumer of taxi services.' 
The relevant marks were expunged (ibid para 299). In summary, it appears that 
distinctiveness is the first hurdle that must be crossed. Even an unusual shape is 
necessary but not sufficient in the context of inherent distinctiveness. It was further said 
that the shape has to differ 'significantly' from those in the sector (cf the Jaguar ruling 
(supra)). Certainly not registrable is a mere variation of the typical shape of a car. 
Technical results 
With the exception of a shape that gives substantial value to the goods, South African 
legislation is comparable to the European Directive and Regulations in this context (our 
case law might of course differ, as occurred in the 'Kit-Kat' case — Société des Produits 
Nestlé SA v International Foodstuffs Co & others [2015] 1 All SA 492 (SCA)). This aspect 
requires brief attention. Section 10(5) of the South African Trade Marks Act 194 of 
1993 states that one cannot register a mark which consists exclusively of the shape, 
configuration, colour or pattern of goods where same is necessary to obtain a specific 
technical result, or results from the nature of the goods themselves. Particular attention 
was given to the phrase regarding the shape of goods which are necessary to obtain a 
technical result in the case of Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer 
Products Ltd (case C-299/99, a decision of the then European Court of Justice, 18 June 
2002). The court stated the policy objective of preventing individuals from using the 
registration of a mark so as to acquire or perpetuate exclusive rights relating to technical 
solutions (ibid para 82). On a substantive level, the principle was formulated that where 
the essential functional characteristics of the shape of a product are attributable solely to 
the technical result, the registration of a sign consisting of that shape is precluded, even 
if that technical result can be achieved by other shapes (ibid para 83). The later decision 
in Lego Juris v Office for the Harmonisation of the Internal Market (case T-270/06, a 
decision of the then European Court of Justice, 14 September 2010) expanded on these 
views. It was held that when the shape of goods merely incorporates the technical 
solution developed by the manufacturer of that product and patented by it, protection of 
that shape as a trade mark, once the patent has expired, would considerably and 
permanently reduce the opportunity for other undertakings 
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to use that technical solution (ibid para 46). Paragraph 83 of the Philips case was also 
accepted (ibid para 58). 
The exterior parts of a car might be seen to have a functional purpose, yet their 
shapes are not attributable solely to the technical result they might achieve. This might 
also be apparent from the London Taxi and Jaguar rulings (supra) where this aspect did 
not play any role. Thomas Hays 'Distinguishing use versus functional use: Three-
dimensional marks' in Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon (eds) Trade Mark Use (2005) 93 at 
103 states that for a 'three-dimensional mark to be validly registered, there must be an 
element of freedom in how the shape of the mark is determined, independent of 
functional concerns'. In line with this argument is the fact that even exterior body parts 
of a car can be registered as trade marks — the distinctive grille of a Jeep for instance 
(DaimlerChrysler Corporation v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade 
Marks and Designs) (case T-128/01 Court of First Instance of the European Union, 
judgment, 6 March 2003)). The mark is indeed applied to a functional article, but there 
are no technical imperatives vis-à-vis the shape. 
Trade-mark infringement 
Returning to the London Taxi decision, as regards infringement, at issue was, firstly, art 
5(1)(b)) of the Directive which deals with same or similar marks or goods. In the course 
of deciding on infringement the court indicated that it would consider the likelihood of 
confusion on the part of consumers of taxi services, a group which would pay less 
attention than taxi drivers (ibid para 248). This would involve a visual comparison (ibid 
para 251). The court first addressed five preliminary points, though. The first was that 
the new allegedly infringing cabs (Metrocabs) were noticeably wider than the existing 
cabs, but this difference was said to be disregarded, since the marks contained no 
indication of scale and are not restricted to any particular size (ibid para 252). The 
second was that the Metrocabs bore prominent advertising, which would decrease the 
likelihood of confusion, but it was said that consumers of taxi services do not always pay 
attention to advertising on the exterior of taxis (ibid para 253). 
The third point, raised in defence of the view that there would be no confusion, (albeit 
one which appears somewhat contradictory) is that even if the prominent Metrocab 
advertising were disregarded, the Metrocab had less prominent branding in the places 
where one would expect it. This argument was also rejected by the court, as there is no 
reason to think that all consumers would be aware that the Metrocab trade mark 
denoted a different trade origin to that of the trade marks concerned (ibid para 254). In 
the fourth place it was argued that the front of a cab is the most prominent part of it; 
but the court pointed out that a consumer might approach a taxi from different angles 
(ibid para 255). Lastly, consumers of taxi services also see taxis under different 
conditions, including different weather situations, times of day, and under street lighting. 
This had to be considered when comparing the relevant shapes (ibid para 256). 
2017 SALJ 230 
The likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, but in the case of a 
comparison of an actual car with the registered 'paper' version, some detail might be 
involved (Sabel BV v Puma AG, Rudolf Dassler Sport (case C-251/95, judgment of the 
then European Court of Justice, 11 November 1997 para 22)). To indicate the level of 
scrutiny of the vehicles the court ultimately conducted, the following is relevant. The 
court considered certain differences between the new cabs and the registered trade 
marks (London Taxi (supra) para 257). These included a large and upright windscreen; a 
tapering bonnet; a deep/high bonnet; a prominent grille; a central 'TAXI' light on the 
roof; round headlights flanking the grille; and a generally rounded body shape. 
On an overall assessment the court decided that there was no likelihood of confusion 
even on the part of consumers of taxi services (ibid para 262). The art 
5(1)(b) infringement action was, accordingly, rejected. Article 5(2) of the Directive, 
which proscribes taking unfair advantage of a famous mark, was also considered, but it 
was found that an image was not transferred, and this ground of infringement was also 
rejected (ibid para 267). 
The general test that would apply to a case of an allegedly infringing mark (s 
34(1)(a) of the South African Trade Marks Act) is set out in Verimark (Pty) Ltd v BMW 
AG2007 (6) SA 263 (SCA) para 7, namely that what is required 'is an interpretation of 
the mark through the eyes of the consumer as used by the alleged infringer. If the use 
creates an impression of a material link between the product and the owner of the mark, 
there is infringement; otherwise, there is not.' Again, one would face the situation that a 
consumer contemplating the purchase of a car would study the market well, read 
relevant literature and so forth, so that when visiting dealership B, he or she would be 
well aware that it is not dealership A — and added thereto is the high cost of the product 
involved (Lancer Trade Mark [1987] RPC 303 at 318). One does have a sense of 
unfairness, though, in that the 'aesthetic enjoyment' of an appealing shape that 'fell off 
the back of a truck' (to use an idiom related to the vehicle world) is open to 
misappropriation. 
That leaves the option of relying on dilution protection on the basis of the competitor 
taking unfair advantage of the original shape (s 34(1)(c) of the South African Trade 
Marks Act) — a point also raised in the London Taxi judgment. The absence of confusion 
would also be problematic here. One should bear in mind the dictum of the court in para 
13 of the Verimarkjudgment (supra): 'But that does not mean that the fact that the 
mark has been used in a non-trade mark sense is irrelevant; to the contrary, it may be 
very relevant to determine whether unfair advantage has been taken.' Moreover, the 
court said in the very next paragraph (para 14): '[T]he provision is not intended to 
enable the proprietor of a well-known registered mark to object as a matter of course to 
the use of a sign which may remind people of his mark.' So two vehicles may be similar 
to such a degree that B is reminiscent of A, but that in itself would not be enough. 
Design law 
Generally speaking designs protect the visual appearance of an article and not the 
function thereof. Consequently, they are eminently suited to protect the 
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whole of a car's shape — broadly speaking, the aesthetics of the vehicle. One accordingly 
finds, from time to time, that vehicle manufacturers indeed file, for instance, a photo of 
the whole vehicle. Questions that may arise are what if car A resembles car B, or two 
cars from the same manufacturer resemble each other. Alternatively, what would 
happen where a designer moves to a different company but takes his or her design 
philosophy and signature styling along? Of particular interest is the position of spare 
parts in our law. Our Designs Act 195 of 1993 allows for registration of articles in the 
functional part, as well as in the aesthetic part of the register. Aesthetic designs have 
features which 'appeal to and are judged solely by the eye, irrespective of the aesthetic 
quality thereof'. Functional designs have 'features which are necessitated by the function 
which the article to which the design is applied, is to perform' (s1(1)). 
Our law provides that a functional design in the nature of a spare part for a machine, 
vehicle or equipment will not afford any rights to the proprietor of such a design (s 
14(6)). For this reason, designs for individual vehicle parts that had features that could 
be considered 'necessitated by the function the articles were to perform' but also have 
aesthetic aspects, were not registered in the functional part of the register, but only in 
the aesthetic part. This issue came to the fore in the well-known appeal case 
of Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft v Grandmark International2014 (1) SA 
323 (SCA) (on which see Mikhalien du Bois & Coenraad Visser 'Aesthetic design rights to 
spare parts? Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft v Grandmark International 
(Pty) Ltd' (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ 84). The court found that replacement parts of a vehicle 
do not qualify as aesthetic designs, as these individual parts used during repair of the 
vehicle are not selected for their appeal to the eye, but rather for the function that the 
article is to perform, namely to replace a component to restore the original appearance 
of the vehicle (ibid para 13). The court was in effect of the opinion that because a 
vehicle spare part has a function (to replace another part) all of the visual features 
thereof are functional features. The decision is controversial, but did not impact the 
possibility of registering a design for complete vehicles in practice, only for individual 
parts thereof. There is a school of thought that the court misinterpreted the Designs Act 
(see L Cilliers 'BMW and the art of registered designs' Spoor and Fisher newsletter, 6 
September 2012, available at http://www.spoor.com/en/News/bmw-and-the-art-of-
registered-designs/, accessed on 25 June 2016). 
It is arguable that the court failed to distinguish between the function of a spare part, 
on the one hand, and on the other hand the fact that many spare parts have an 
appearance which is partly dictated by function and partly by aesthetics. The fact that a 
spare part is intended to serve the function of replacing the original part does not mean 
that at least some of the visual aspects of the spare part cannot be influenced by 
aesthetic considerations. There are obviously spare parts where the visual appearance is 
dictated exclusively by functional considerations. And those spare parts would obviously 
not qualify to be registered as an aesthetic design. But many spare 
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parts have a visual appearance which is constituted by a combination of functional and 
aesthetic considerations. It is suggested that the correct interpretation of the Designs 
Act is to allow for the aesthetic visual considerations of those parts to be protected in the 
aesthetic class. A typical example would be a gear lever, steering wheel or customised 
hub caps of a car. 
An aesthetic design must be new (novel) and original. Novelty requires a notable 
difference between the article in question and the prior art. The novelty of a design is a 
factual matter, to be judged by the eye. The entire design need not be novel — most 
parts may be old, but only a particular aspect which is new may impart the character of 
novelty to the whole design (Walker & Co v AG Scott & Co Ltd ((1892) 9 RPC 482 at 
485)). According to T D Burrell Burrell's South African Patent and Design Law 3 ed 
(1999) para 9.73 the 'original' requirement probably means that the design must be a 
product of the author's own labour and skill. The scope of protection of a design will 
generally be influenced by how similar the new design is to earlier, prior, art designs. 
The more different a new vehicle design is from the closest existing vehicle, the more 
different will a competitor's vehicle need to be to avoid infringement. 
The question remains as to whose eye is to judge a registered design. In Swisstool 
Manufacturing Co v Omega Africa Plastics1975 (4) SA 379 (W) the court said that 'I do 
not think that it is inconsistent with what was said in the South African decisions to hold 
that while the eye is to be the eye of the Court, the Court should view the design 
through the spectacles of the customer' (at 383B). The court thus looks at the alleged 
infringing article as a purchaser of a car would. Accordingly, the court must decide if the 
features of the filing and the car are too close. Also relevant is the European Design 
Council Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on 
Community designs (OJ EC No L 3 of 5.1.2002 at 1) amended by Council Regulation No 
1891/2006 of 18 December 2006 amending Regulations (EC) No 6/2002 and (EC) No 
40/94 to give effect to the accession of the European Community to the Geneva Act of 
the Hague Agreement concerning the international registration of industrial designs (OJ 
EC No L 386 of 29.12.2006 at 14). In terms of this system, reliance is placed on the 
notion of an 'informed user' to assess whether a design has the required 'individual 
character' to be registrable, and also to assess infringement. In the case of PepsiCo v 
Grupo Promer Mon Graphic (case C-281/10 P, judgment by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, 20 October 2011), it was held that the 'informed user' is not a user of 
average attention, but is a particularly observant one, either because of personal 
experience or due to their extensive knowledge of the sector in question (ibid para 53). 
When possible, the informed user will make a direct comparison between the designs in 
issue, although this may not always be practicable (ibid para 55). The informed user is 
not a technical expert, but knows the available designs in the field concerned and has a 
high level of attention in using the relevant products due to their interest therein (ibid 
para 59). 
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An interesting question arises when motor vehicle manufactures apply a so-called 
'facelift' to a model during the model's lifetime and before it is replaced by a new-
generation model. Will an existing design registered for the appearance of the original 
vehicle also cover a facelifted model if the facelifted model has, for example, new 
bumpers, headlights and the like? The answer is not straightforward, and will need to be 
considered on a case-by-case basis and based of course on the test employed by the 
jurisdiction of concern. Also, what about vehicles such as the Porsche 911, for which 
some may argue that the overall appearance has not radically changed over its lifespan? 
Once again, a design for a new model will afford protection in as much as the new design 
differs from the previous design. Such a case has not yet come before our courts. 
However, one could expect the likely customer of such a vehicle to be a discerning buyer 
paying particular attention to the vehicle the customer is purchasing. This buyer may be 
found able to pick up subtle differences between different generations of the same 
model, with the result that the copying of such subtly different features may result in 
infringement. 
Patent law 
The Patents Act 57 of 1978 excludes the registration of aesthetic creations as such (s 
25(2)(d)), and as it was submitted above that a car as such can be seen to be an 
aesthetic creation, to protect the unitary shape by means of attempting to register a 
patent might be difficult. One might of course be able to patent individual 'functioning' 
components. Some components that are patentable may indeed influence the shape, but 
the shape as a whole should still be seen as an aesthetic form; after all, there are 
hundreds of vehicle shapes that function, more or less, on the same basis, yet they all 
look different due to aesthetic considerations. 
In some specific cases it may be possible, arguably, to obtain indirect protection for 
the overall shape of a vehicle. If, for instance, a vehicle is manufactured that resembles 
an aeroplane's wing, and that shape embodies sufficient advantages to be seen as an 
invention, one can indirectly obtain protection for the shape. One should note that it 
should still be an 'invention' as envisaged in the Patents Act, and that a design that is 
created for aesthetic reasons will not qualify as an invention if it has characteristics that 
cannot be seen as inventive. For example, to adapt the body of a vehicle to ensure 
better airflow will not easily be seen as inventive, as an expert might see it as obvious 
that an adapted profile can ensure a better air flow. If the body is adapted in an 
unexpected manner for airflow improvements, that could possibly be patentable. 
However, protection will be limited to a vehicle with such an unexpected adaptation, and 
vehicles that are identical bar that adaptation will not be protected by the patent. It can 
be noted that in Van der Merwe v Els 2008 BIP 404 (C) at 405 patents were indeed 
granted — taking their validity on face value — for the shapes of the hull of a catamaran. 
2017 SALJ 234 
Conclusion 
Everything considered, the Designs Act is the most apposite basis for the protection of 
car shapes. Moreover, it provides the advantage of certainty, namely a specific cut-off 
period for the protection of the shapes. This could also be said to apply to the Copyright 
Act, but that is legislation which was not meant to solve this problem. The Trade Marks 
Act provides protection for an indefinite period, but was also not adopted with the 
protection of automobiles in mind, and is in any event ambiguous about protecting 
shapes in general. Protection in terms of the remedy of passing off seems appropriate, 
and the duration of the existence of a reputation/confusion might be a limiting and 
legitimising factor. The difficult question that remains is how to deal with the general 
remedy of unlawful competition. This question arises in a context where judgments over 
many years have cautioned against granting too wide protection to shapes. This is 
encapsulated by the Premier Hangers ruling which stated ((supra) para 16): 
'What is also clear is that in general in our system of law, as with the English system and other 
systems, efforts have been made both to prevent double or overlapping protection and to ensure 
strict time limits to the monopoly periods granted.' 
Accordingly, strictly speaking, the Afinta judgment might have been delivered per 
incuriam, even though the facts too cry out for judicial intervention. The judgment, 
interestingly, contains no reference to the Premier Hangers decision. Recently, speaking 
generally, the Supreme Court of Appeal said that '[i]t follows that the attempt by the 
appellant to ground a cause of action based on unlawful competition in these 
circumstances is ill conceived' (Cochrane Steel Products (Pty) Ltd v M-Systems Group 
(Pty) Ltd & another2016 (6) SA 1 (SCA) para 25). 
Ultimately, in making the choice of how to deal with such cases, the question that 
arises is where the residual balance should lie: an assessment that, as mentioned in 
the Van der Merwe ruling (supra), requires working with an 'involved' article, and which 
includes the problem of time lines. Arguably, it is easier to hail a cab than to solve the 
dilemma. 
  
  
 
